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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (a) (1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure, the 
undersigned counsel for Appellant represents that the named parties, Susan Deneen 
Brown, and Utah Transit Authority, are and have been the only parties to this 
litigation. 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is on review from an order of the Third District Court by the Honorable 
Judge William A. Thorne, Jr. The Appellant/Plaintiff, Susan Deneen Brown, 
filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to § 78-2-2 and 
Rules 3 and 4 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did Appellant/Plaintiff Susan Deneen Brown sufficiently comply with the 
notice of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act that apply 
when an individual sues a political subdivision. See § 63-30-11 through 63-30-
13 Utah Code Annotated. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue of 
statutory interpretation is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. 
Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994), Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 
P.2d 770 (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether Judge Thorne committed reversible error in granting 
Appellee/Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in his statutory 
interpretation of the notice of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. See § 63-30-11 through 63-30-13 Utah Code Annotated 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue of 
statutory interpretation is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. 
Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994), Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 
822 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 24, 1995, the Plaintiff/Appellant, Susan Deneen Brown, 
hereinafter referred to as "Brown", fell while using a Utah Transit Authority 
bus as a passenger. On or about March 1, 1996, a Notice of Claim was sent on 
Brown's behalf by certified mail to the Appellee/ Defendant Utah Transit 
Authority, hereinafter referred to as "UTA". On or about March 1, 1996 a 
Notice of Claim was sent by certified mail to the Office of Attorney General, 
State of Utah. 
On or about March 8, 1996, two U.S. Postal return receipts were received by 
the Brown's counsel. The one from the Attorney General's office was stamped 
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and signed as received; the one from the Utah Transit Authority was returned 
unsigned.Tr.00031. Accordingly, a staff member of the law firm telephoned 
the Utah Transit Authority Risk Management Department to verify if in fact 
the Notice of Claim had been received.Ti\000033 James Anderson of that 
department confirmed that he had received the Notice of Claim on March 6, 
1996. 
On March 4, 1997 the complaint was filed, within the one year, following 
rejection of the claim by Utah Transit Authority.Tr.00001-4. UTA filed an 
answer to the complaint on or about March 25,1997.Tr.00010-13. On August 
14, 1997 UTA filed a motion for summary judgment.Tr.00016-17 Both UTA 
and Brown filed affidavits and memorandums pursuant to said motion.Tr. 
00018-26, Tr.00028-30, Tr.00032-41 On October 31, 1997 Judge William A. 
Thorne, Jr. entered a minute entry granting UTA's motion for summary 
judgment.Tr. 00044. Brown filed a notice of appeal on November 25, 1997. 
Tr.00046. The Supreme Court advised Brown's counsel that its notice was 
premature since there was no "final order" but only a minute entry. UTA's 
counsel submitted an order but it was never signed. Brown's counsel recently 
submitted an order, however Judge Thome's successor, Judge Dever, entered a 
minute entry on February 28, 2001 stating that a "signed minute entry 
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constitutes a final order of the Court and an additional order is not necessary." 
Tr. no number 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Brown sufficiently complied with the notice of claim provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act that apply when an individual sues a political 
subdivision when she sent written notice to the State of Utah Attorney General's 
Office and UTA's Risk Management Department on or about March 1, 1996 by 
certified mail. 
Judge Thorne committed reversible error in granting 
Appellee/Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in his statutory 
interpretation of the notice of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. See § 63-30-11 through 63-30-13 Utah Code Annotated 
V. ARGUMENT 
Appellant/Plaintiff Susan Deneen Brown sufficiently complied with the 
notice of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act that 
apply when an individual sues a political subdivision. 
Brown, a passenger, fell while using a UTA bus on March 24, 1995. On or 
about March 1, 1996 a Notice of Claim was sent on Brown's behalf by 
certified mail to the Utah Transit Authority, Risk Management Department. On 
or about March 1, 1996 a Notice of Claim was sent by certified mail to the 
Office of Attorney General, State of Utah. On or about March 8, 1996, 
Brown's counsel received two U.S. Postal return receipts. The postal receipt 
from the Attorney General's Office was stamped and signed as received; the 
receipt from the Utah Transit Authority was returned unsigned.Tr.00031. 
Accordingly, a staff member of the law firm representing Brown telephoned 
the Utah Transit Authority Risk Management Department to verify if in fact 
the Notice of Claim had been received.Tr.00033. James Anderson of that 
department confirmed that he had received the Notice of Claim on March 6, 
1996.Tr.00039. Brown complied sufficiently with notice of claim provisions 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act that apply when an individual sues a 
political subdivision. See § 63-30-11 through 63-30-13 Utah Code Annotated. 
There is no question regarding the notice of claim sent to the Attorney 
General's office. The only question raised by UTA is as to the notice to UTA 
itself. UTA claims that because the Notice of Claim was received by the Risk 
Management Department of UTA that the Notice fails because it was not 
served on the "governing body".Tr. 00019-20. As one may expect, the 
legislature did not ever define the "governing body" of public transit districts. 
In Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998) this Court 
stated, 
5 
"... 'governing body' is not specifically defined in the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act." 
In the case of Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994) the Court 
faced a similar problem in defining the term "agency concerned" as used in § 
63-30-12 Utah Code Annotated. There, an individual named Brittain had 
slipped and fallen at the Utah Department of Employment Security aka Job 
Service. It would appear that Job Service would be the "agency concerned". 
However, the Appellate Court stated, 
"To interpret a statute, we first examine its plain language and will 
resort to other methods of statutory interpretation only if we 
determine that the language is ambiguous.... 
The Legislature.... employed the more nebulous and far 
broader language of 'the agency concerned.'... 
Because the term 'agency concerned' is not clear on its face, we 
will interpret the notice requirement of section 63-30-12 in a manner 
consistent with the overall purpose of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court, '[i]t is 
necessary to consider the policy of the notice requirement so that in 
any particular case the facts can be evaluated to determine if the 
intent of the statute has been accomplished.' Stahl v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980)" 
In the present case, "governing body" is at least as unclear as "agency 
concerned" is in Brittain. 
Webster's Dictionary defines govern as " to exercise a directing influence 
over". Its definition of body as pertains to governing body is " a collective 
group". Governing body must mean those people that run UTA. The claims 
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representative exercises a directing influence over the Risk Management of UTA. 
Is he not then part of the group inferred to be the "governing body" referred to in 
the statute? 
In Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App.1994) the Court went on to state, 
" ' [T]he primary purpose of a notice of claim requirement 
is to afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to pursue 
a proper and timely investigation of the merits of the claim and to 
arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the 
expenditure of public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation.' 
Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980). ... Lastly, 
the requirement that the notice be in writing protects against the 
passage of time obscuring the memory and distorting a plaintiffs 
recollection of the events, which are at the heart of the claim. See 
Stahl, 618P.2d480." 
In light of the broad language of § 63-30-13 and the aforementioned policy 
considerations, it is Brown's contention that the written notice sent to the Risk 
Management Department of UTA constitutes compliance with § 63-30-13 Utah 
Code Annotated. In Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343 (Utahl998), 
this Court found that the claim should have been served on the city council, yet 
found that service on the city recorder was adequate. 
In the case at bar, the Risk Management Department of UTA is located in the 
same building as the UTA and is a part of the UTA; while in Brittain, it was 
State of Utah Risk Management, whose agency was not located [emphasis 
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added] in the same building as Job Service and State of Utah Risk Management 
was not even a part [emphasis added] of Job Service. 
The UTA Risk Management Department had to take an active role in Brown's 
claim and, in fact, did so by investigating the claim and deciding to pay for some 
of the medical expenses of the injured Brown.Tr.0003S>. Further, the Court in 
Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App.1994) stated., 
'The duties of Risk Management mandate it take an active role in 
Brittain's claim and clearly suggest it is the agency concerned. To 
begin with, Risk Management is authorized by law to handle 
Brittain's claim, representing the interests of the State. Risk 
Management is empowered with broad-based authority to handle 
claims on behalf of the State." 
In this case, one of the duties of the Risk Management Department is to handle 
claims, such as Brown's, on behalf of UTA.Tr.00038. Therefore, it is the Risk 
Management Department that is the governing body of risk management for 
UTA. Further, since the Risk Management Department is entrusted with the 
investigating and settling or defending against claims received, then it stands to 
reason that if the Risk Management Department is notified in a timely manner, 
then the requirement of providing notice is met. In Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 
(Utah App.1994), the Appellate Court stated, 
44
 Moreover, Brittain fulfilled the purpose of section 63-30-12 by 
filing notice of his claim with the attorney general and Risk 
Management, [emphasis added] Considering the duties delegated to 
Risk Management, it appears the state entity entrusted with 
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investigating and settling or defending the claim received the 
requisite notice in a timely manner and well within the one-year 
period imposed by the statute. Filing notice with Risk Management in 
no way inhibited the possibility of settling the claim without resort to 
litigation. In fact, given the powers and responsibilities the 
Legislature has bestowed upon Risk Management, the opposite is 
true, [emphasis added] Filing notice with Risk Management 
facilitated settlement discussions by providing notice to the agency 
responsible for the investigating and settling the claim and obviated 
the risk that Job Service or DFCM would fail to forward the notice to 
Risk Management as required by law." 
By providing notice to the department responsible for investigating and settling 
the claim, it obviated the risk that the "governing body", whosoever that may be 
and it may include Risk Management, would not give the claim to the Risk 
Management Department. Notice to UTA through the Risk Management 
Department was adequate, if not the best method of notice, fulfilling the purposes 
of the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See Brittain 
v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994). 
B. Judge Thorne committed reversible error in granting 
Appellee/Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in his statutory 
interpretation of the notice of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. See § 63-30-11 through 63-30-13 Utah Code Annotated 
It is apparent from the case law that Brown complied with the notice 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. In Brittain v. State, 882 
P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994) it was determined that notice to risk management was 
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sufficient if not the best notice under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that Brown failed to comply with § 
63-30-13 Utah Code Annotated. Hence the matter must be reversed and 
remanded for trial on the merits. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994), the Appellate 
Court found service of the Notice of Claim on Risk Management was proper. 
Brown served her Notice of Claim on the Risk Management Department of 
UTA. By doing so, Brown adequately complied with the notice of claim 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Therefore the summary 
judgment entered dismissing her case was in error and must be reversed, 
allowing Brown her day in court. 
DATED this _ / day of May 2001. 
I. KepCHolland 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
(J* Udd^Yxd 
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